The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Panel) is in its twenty-third year of existence. It was created to coordinate the discovery, or pretrial, phase of cases involving common questions of fact that have been filed in different federal district courts. 2 The Panel's objective is to promote efficient and expeditious processing of these factually related cases. 3
language, and purpose of § 1407. Part IV.B shows that the alternative trial technique-consent of the parties-is also highly suspect under the present statutory scheme.
Beyond these "legalistic" arguments, however, are practical problems with the present system for obtaining consolidated trial. Part IV.C shows the desirability of expanding the Panel's power to include transfer for trial. Modifying § 1407 in this manner would, among other things, permit an impartial, expert body--the Panel-to scrutinize the appropriateness of consolidated trial, eliminate the rigid and prohibitive limitations on transfer under § 1404(a), and increase the flexibility in selecting the trial forum. This change would create a highly pragmatic system for multidistrict litigation. Part V examines how the Panel would wield its expanded power.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE PANEL
In the early 1960s federal courts were swamped with electrical equipment antitrust cases. After successful criminal prosecutions of the manufacturers, some 2,000 private damage actions were filed in thirty-five federal district courts during a twelve-month period. 1 0 Massive duplication of pretrial efforts was imminent, creating fears of interminable discovery delays. In response, Chief Justice Earl Warren, following a recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States, created the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts (Coordinating Committee)."' Using uniform pretrial and discovery orders, national depositions, 12 and central document depositories, all of the cases were concluded by 1967.13 The vice chairman of the Coordinating Committee, Judge Edwin A. Robson, estimated that UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:711 without the ad hoc committee cases might have lingered for as long as twenty years.
14 Although judges were quite pleased with the expeditious termination of the electrical equipment cases, 15 the shortcomings of the Coordinating Committee were readily evident. The procedure was inefficient. Often thirty or more district judges had to coordinate their personal schedules to convene in one location to discuss problems and meet with counsel. In addition, the voluntary process hinged upon complete agreement among the judges. 16 The Coordinating Committee's members envisioned a legislatively created judicial panel designed to deal efficiently with instances of mass, multidistrict litigation. Their vision soon became a reality.
II. CREATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE PANEL
In the spring of 1968, § 1407 was added to the United States Judicial Code.
1 7 Congress enacted into law, for the most part, the blueprint drafted by the Coordinating Committee; 18 it created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
A. The Statutory Scheme
The Panel consists of seven circuit and district court judges chosen by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The Panel is empowered to transfer to any federal district court "civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact... for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 20 Two points warrant emphasis. First, the Panel can transfer an action to any district; jurisdiction and venue objections will not prevent the Panel from transferring a case. 2 1 Second, transfer is only for pretrial purposes. When pretrial affairs are completed, the case "shall be remanded ... to the district from which it was transferred." 22 Proceedings to consolidate may-be initiated by the Panel sua sponte 2 3 or upon motion "by a party in any action in which transfer ... may be appropriate." 24 After consolidation proceedings are initiated, "the parties in all actions in which transfers ... are contemplated" 25 receive notice of a hearing at which the issue of transfer is argued. Consolidation is ordered "upon [the Panel 's] determination that transfers for such [coordinated and consolidated pretrial] proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 2 6 If a party disagrees with a Panel decision ordering transfer, review is sought by extraordinary writ. 2 7 An order denying transfer for pretrial, however, is not reviewable.
28
Congress has granted the Panel authority to promulgate rules "for the conduct of its business." 29 The Panel has adopted nineteen rules governing ministerial and procedural aspects of its involvement in multidistrict litigation. 
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B. The Panel in Action
The Mechanics of a Panel Session
Once every two months the Panel holds hearings to determine if the matters before it should be consolidated for pretrial proceedings. 31 On a hearing day, the Panel entertains arguments in the morning and retires to an executive meeting in the afternoon. In a typical morning session, it hears oral argument on eight to fifteen matters.
3
A "matter" is a group of closely related cases, ostensibly having one or more common questions of fact, that are being considered under a motion to consolidate. Because of the enormous number of actions that may be transferred in one order, counsel in each individual case is usually not heard. On each new matter, a maximum of one-half hour of oral argument is permitted; parties with different viewpoints are allotted equal amounts of time. There may, however, be instances in which all counsel involved in the cases under consideration will be heard. As few as two or three actions may be combined and transferred for pretrial proceedings. See Panel typically are narrow: do the actions warrant § 1407 treatment and, if so, where is the appropriate transferee forum?" 8 Although these issues are fundamental in multidistrict litigation, they are relatively straightforward; limited oral argument encourages counsel to focus on the transfer issues. In special circumstances the Panel will allow for more argument. 3 9 A hearing on each matter is not necessary, however, and oral argument is not encouraged.°S ometimes parties waive oral argument, allowing the Panel to decide a transfer motion on the basis of briefs. 41 In the afternoon executive conference, the Panel discusses cases argued in the morning session and addresses other pertinent business. 42 A decision regarding transfer of "tag-along" actions is usually made within a week. 43 Rulings on new matters may take longer. The Panel cannot transfer cases, however, until it receives consent from the proposed transferee court. 44 Generally, the entire process, from oral argument to transfer, is completed within a month. 4 5 38 The "transferee" and "transferor" forum are defined supra note 8. Recent transfer orders are ofaproforma nature and rarely deal with construing § 1407. Rather, the concern is whether the particular matter before the Panel should be consolidated, and ifso, in which transferee forum. The orders are characteristically short and simple, stating merely the Panel's conclusion. The typical order consists of four paragraphs. The first paragraph identifies the actions: "This litigation presently consists of .... " The second paragraph reveals the decision on transfer: "On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing held, the Panel finds .... " The third paragraph identifies the transferee forum: "We are persuaded that [ 
a. Promoting Just and Efficient Conduct of the Actions Involved
The most influential factor in the transfer decision is whether a saving in resources will result from consolidation. 52 On this score, Congress was unambiguous: "The main purpose of transfer for consolidation or coordination of pretrial proceedings is to promote the ends of efficient justice . . . ."5 "Efficient justice" is largely oriented toward saving judicial resources, although litigants' resources may be preserved simultaneously. 54 Efficient judicial administration can be achieved by conducting the pretrial proceedings of related cases in one forum. The duplication of discovery that would result from trying the actions individually can be avoided. One judge can issue a single ruling on pretrial matters, avoiding repeated rulings on the same issue and the possibility of conflicting rulings by numerous judges. 55 Generally, pretrial consolidation will not conserve judicial resources nor serve the interests of the litigants if the cases are nearing trial in the transferor forum, or if discovery is well along. 5 6 In these circumstances the Panel often refuses to transfer cases. In In re "Lite Beer" Trademark Litigation, 5 7 for example, the Panel, noting that "it appears from the parties' representations... that discovery is substantially completed in the Schlitz and Peter Hand actions and that both actions are nearing trial," concluded: "Under these circumstances, transfer will not further the purposes of section 1407.
" 58
52 This is not surprising as such a concern gave rise to § 1407. 
b. Convenience of Parties and Witnesses
The Coordinating Committee draft of the multidistrict litigation statute did not include "convenience of parties and witnesses" as a factor in the transfer decision; this provision was added by Congress in § 1407(a). The Senate Committee on theJudiciary noted that the "amendment makes it clear that the convenience of parties and witnesses shall be weighed as a factor in determining whether transfer should be made."
59
In practice, the weight accorded the convenience factor has been minuscule. 60 The Panel's failure to heed this congressional admonishment prompted one commentator to remark that "the Panel has assumed-and routinely rules without further explanation-that transfer of an action which meets the other statutory requirements will be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, despite the protests of counsel and parties."
61 Indeed, the Panel may consolidate even if all parties in the matter object.
62
Despite inconveniences to individual litigants, benefits may accrue to the parties collectively as a result of consolidation. In litigation where documents abound, central depositories can greatly reduce the overall cost of duplication, and common depositions may save hundreds of hours of the attorneys' and deponents' time. If "convenience" is viewed from a group perspective, the Panel may be satisfying § 1407's command that transfers be "for the convenience of parties and witnesses" more often than some commentators imply.
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(listing the well-advanced status of pretrial proceedings as a strike against transfer); In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (consolidating some related cases but refusing to transfer actions against one defendant because discovery was nearly complete and the cases were ready for trial The court is not considering the transfer of one case from one district to another but rather the transfer and consolidation of 32 cases filed in twelve
c. Actions Involving One or More Common Questions of Fact
The statutory requirement that cases must involve common questions of fact poses no barrier when the Panel deems transfer proper. A common question of fact in the related cases is not difficult to identify. " [T] he cases suggest that if the Panel feels the matter should be consolidated under section 1407, common questions of fact will be found to exist in order to justify the transfer." 64 In sum, the Panel has wide latitude to transfer cases it believes will be beneficially handled through consolidated pretrial proceedings. The liveliest topic at most Panel proceedings is the debate over the appropriate transferee forum. Not uncommonly, the parties and the Panel will agree that consolidation is proper, but will vehemently disagree as to the best transferee court. 66 Although districts into one district for trial. Thus, instead of looking to the individual convenience of each party and each witness, the court must look to the overall convenience of all parties and witnesses. Id. at 304 (footnote omitted).
In the § 1407 context, the Panel has held: Of course itis to the interest of each plaintiff to have all of the proceedings in his suit handled in his district. But the Panel must weigh the interests of all the plaintiffs and all the defendants, and must consider multiple litigation as a whole in the light of the purposes of the law. 
In re
Cases Commonly Consolidated
Actions of any nature may be transferred by the Panel. The most routinely consolidated matters, however, are antitrust cases, securities litigation, products liability suits, and air crash disaster claims.
73 This is unsurprising; litigation of this sort frequently involves large numbers of litigants, and the Panel was created to handle such matters efficiently.
III. TERMINATION IN THE TRANSFEREE FORUM
Section 1407 requires individual cases to be remanded to their respective transferor courts upon completion of pretrial proceedings in the transferee forum. 74 The Panel holds this remand power, although in practice it will not remand without approval by the transferee judge. 75 There is, however, a "hidden" proviso in § 1407(a) which may preclude remand: "Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously teminated .... "76
A. Pretrial Termination by the Transferee Judge
Transfereejudges have paid substantial allegiance to the proviso. It is generally accepted that a transferee judge has authority to decide all pretrial motions, including motions that may be dispositive, such as motions for judgment approving a settlement, for dismissal, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), for striking an affirmative defense, for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a) and to quash service of process.
78
For the most part, use of these disposal techniques is non-controversial. The statute itself recognizes the possibility of termination during pretrial proceedings, 79 and to effectuate termination the transferee judge must be empowered to decide dispositive motions.
An example of the propriety, and perhaps necessity, of pretrial disposal is evident in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation.
80
Hundreds of claims against manufacturers of Agent Orange, a herbicide used in Vietnam, were transferred to Judge Jack Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York. The Panel consolidated many of these cases, and others came from state courts. After five years of litigation, the parties agreed to a $180 million settlement. In addition, Judge Weinstein granted summary judgment against all plaintiffs who opted out of the certified class. It would have been an awkward situation and a waste ofjudicial time if'Judge Weinstein had not possessed power to approve the settlement offer. Presumably, each case would have been remanded to its transferor court, and each judge therein would have had to individually approve the settlement offer. Greater difficulty and confusion would have arisen if on remand some judges rejected the settlement offer. Remanding for transferor court approval would create the problem encountered by the Coordinating Committee; settlement approval would hinge upon complete agreement among a multitude of district court judges. 8 1 Use of the remand process to seek approval of settlement offers would be time consuming and perhaps unsuccessful. 8 2 For many of the same reasons, the advantages of summary judgment power are apparent. If the transferee judge deems summaryjudgment appropriate, there would be a waste of resources to require remand to each transferor judge for reconsideration of the identical issue. The transferorjudges would have to be familiarized with the case, the files would need to be retransferred, the possibility of diverse rulings by transferor judges would be created, and the potential for several appeals in different circuits on the same issue would exist.
It is also evident that a transferee court needs the ability to rule on a motion to dismiss. If this capability did not exist, the transferee court would be placed in a compromising position. It might refuse to remand, 3 forge ahead with discovery, and hope the motion to dismiss will be denied by the transferorjudges. But if on remand the transferor courts grant the motion to dismiss, valuable time and resources spent in discovery will go for naught. On the other hand, the transferee court might immediately recommend remand in the hope that the motion to dismiss will be granted. But if the transferor courts deny the motion to dismiss the cases would be sent back to the transferee court. Moreover, the transferor judges might rule differently upon the motion. At least two unnecessary and time consuming transfers are precluded by permitting the transferee judge to rule upon the motion to dis- miss.84 In sum, it is highly desirable for a single transferee judge to entertain summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss, and to decide other dispositive issues in pretrial proceedings. Congress recognized this desirability, at least implicitly, when § 1407 was in the process of enactment. 89 Transferee courts may also acquire cases for trial by using 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988). This venue statute provides:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest ofjustice, transfer such a case to any district or division in which it could have been brought. Id. Sections 1406(a) and 1404(a) are quite similar; therefore, § 1406(a) will not be treated as an independent method to achieve trial in the transferee forum. There is, however, an important distinction between these statutes. When § 1404(a) is used, a case is being removed from a forum in which the plaintiff was entitled to bring his claim. But, a case transferred pursuant to § 1406(a) could not have remained in the original forum. If not transferred, the case would be dismissed.
9o See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
1. When used in conjunction with § 1407, however, § 1404(a) discretion rests solely with the transferee judge. The use of § 1404(a) in the multidistrict context to achieve trial in the transferee court involves two simple steps.
First, the Panel consolidates claims under § 1407, sending all cases in the matter to one transferee court for pretrial. Then, during pretrial, a party makes a § 1404(a) motion for transfer of venue. If the transferee judge grants this motion the actions will stay in the transferee court for trial. 9 This is an important distinction between § 1404(a) and § 1407. Under the latter, if the Panel deems transfer beneficial, all related cases will be combined; consolidation does not depend on the transferorjudges whose cases are affected by the Panel's order.
" It is also possible that courts do not know of related actions in other districts to which a case could be transferred for consolidated proceedings. The Historical Development When § 1407 was enacted, Congress did not envision trial of § 1407-consolidated matters in the transferee court. Although it was aware that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) could aid multidistrict litigation, it did not foresee these statutes being utilized by the transferee judge. 9 6 Even so, it did not take long for the Panel and transferee judges to use the statutes in combination with § 1407 to achieve trial in the transferee forum.
During the Panel's first two years, the ability of transfereejudges to employ § 1404(a) was uncertain. . 1207 (N.D. Il. 1969) , the transferee court found that two cases before it were originally filed in an improper venue (i.e. venue in the transferor forum was improper). Rather than remanding the cases to the transferor forum at the conclusion of pretrial, it transferred the actions, using § 1406, to districts in which they could have been brought. See id. at 1211; see also supra note 89 (explaining § 1406(a)). It did not transfer the cases to itself for trial.
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transferee judge transferring an action to another district under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. 1406(a). Such actions will be remanded by the Panel to the district designated in the section 1404(a) or section 1406(a) order.1 0 6
In In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 10 7 the role of § 1404(a) in § 1407 proceedings was directly at issue. The court considered "whether this judge, as a transferee judge, has the authority to transfer actions transferred to the court under section 1407 to another district under section 1404(a)." 10 8
It answered in the affirmative, reasoning that § 1407 did not "in any way limit the normal authority of a district court." 10 9
The court viewed a motion to transfer as a pretrial motion that "generally should be determined prior to the completion of discovery. Id. at 303. Judge Lord, the transferee judge, felt it would be anomalous to conclude that transferee judges have less power than transferor judges. Because transferor judges clearly can rule on § 1404(a) motions, it followed that transferee judges should be able to do the same.
110 Id. 111 Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted).
Lord to vacate his § 1404(a) transfer order.
112
The Second Circuit refused to grant the writ, holding that a transferee judge could use § 1404(a) to consolidate cases for trial. 
C. Advantages of Trial in the Transferee Court
The 1407-1404(a) combination did not develop arbitrarily and parties do not consent to trial in the transferee forum capriciously. Trial in the transferee court is ordered or consented to because it promotes efficient judicial administration and/or is in the interest of litigants. Certainly consolidated trial of every multidistrict litigation is not warranted, but it is often advantageous, and on occasion imperative.
After spending weeks, or even months, governing pretrial stages of a matter, a judge acquires an unparalleled familiarity with the litigation. This familiarity can enhance the smooth and speedy processing of cases through trial. 
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out of the crash in Hanover, New Hampshire. I think it is fair to conclude that I have a working familiarity with the facts, issues, and problems involved. While it would be easy on me, as well as for me, to transfer the cases back to their transferor districts on the completion of pretrial discovery, such transfers would be an abdication of responsibility on my part and would constitute, in this era of congested calendars and long delays of trials, an affront to the orderly and expeditious administration ofjusticeY1 7 The federal court system has yet to exit the "era of congested calendars and long delays of trials." 
S.C. § 292(d) (1988) (note change in subsection letter).
121 The Panel had earlier recognized that § 292(d) might be used to get the transferee judge in the transferor forum. See In re CBS Color Tube Patent Litig., 329 F. Supp. 540,541 n.3 (J.P.M.L. 1971) (stating that "it would be possible to temporarily assign the judge familiar with the litigation to any district in which a trial is to be held").
122 One commentator has suggested that a simple motion by the transfereejudge to the Pancl at the conclusion of pretrial could replace the current assignment process. See Ward, supra note 7, at 258-59. This procedure, however, would not quell the other problems with assignment. transferor district to conduct trial. All the problems attendant to intercircuit assignments are avoided by allowing a judge to try the cases in his own court. Even if these inefficiencies are not bothersome, the practice of assigning judges lends credence to the proposition in this subpart: it is often desirable to get the pretrial judge in a position to conduct trial.
The second, and more pressing, problem exposed by Antibiotic Antitrust is the difficulty of trying one case independently from the rest of the actions in a matter. Ultimately, Judge Lord's special assignment to California went unused. The actions were so complex and intertwined that trial of the seven cases apart from the others was impossible. 12 3 In complicated matters a workable trial plan may require consolidation in a single forum.
Trial in the transferee forum produces additional benefits. One trial in the transferee court replaces several trials of the same issues in various transferor courts. Savings in transactional costs and the parties', witnesses', and courts' time are also realized. Conflicting decisions by transferor courts after remand are avoided 1 24 as are multiple appeals from these decisions. Finally, the task of transferring case files back to transferor courts is avoided.
126
123 See Antibiotic Antitrust, 333 F. Supp. at 301 ("[S]ince these overlaps and conflicts cannot.., be resolved prior to trial, it has become increasingly clear that they can only be satisfactorily resolved by a coordinated or consolidated trial or trials in one district directed by the judge who is most familiar with this massive litigation."). 
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCESS FOR OBTAINING TRIAL IN THE TRANSFEREE FORUM
Although benefits are realized through consolidated trial of certain multidistrict litigations, Congress designed § 1407 so that it would not affect the place of trial in any case. The House and Senate Committees on the judiciary articulated four specific reasons why they did not allow for trial consolidation through § 1407.127
This Part is divided into three Subparts. Subpart A provides a detailed examination of the legislative history, language, and purpose of § 1407, demonstrating that a transferee court's use of § 1404(a) sets Congress's carefully crafted plan for multidistrict litigation on its head. Subpart B scrutinizes the validity of consenting to trial in the transferee court. This practice also conflicts with the design of § 1407 and is rendered suspect by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hoffman v. Blaski. 128 Even if transferee courts could legitimately utilize § 1404(a) or ratify litigants' consent, there are numerous concerns with these methods of procuring cases for trial. Amending § 1407 to permit the Panel to make the decision whether the cases should be consolidated for trial would lend fairness and flexibility to multidistrict litigation. An impartial, expert body would be involved in the decision, the limitations of § 1404(a) would be avoided, and the choice of trial forums would be expanded. Subpart C addresses these issues. The analysis in this Part, combined with the observation that trial in the transferee court can be advantageous (or even necessary), leads to the conclusion that § 1407 needs to be revised.
A. Transferee Court's Use of Section 1404(a) is Prohibited
Judge Lord, in Antibiotic Antitrust, asserted:
There is absolutely no reason to believe that the district judge to whom a case has been assigned under section 1407 has any less authority or power as to matters preceding the actual trial of a 127 First, the experience of the Coordinating Committee for the electrical equipment antitrust cases was limited to pretrial and it was deemed desirable to stay within those bounds. Second, from the standpoint of parties and witnesses, trial in the original forum is generally preferable. Third, it may be impracticable for one transferee court to try all the cases in mass litigation. Fourth, local discovery will probably be necessary to supplement coordinated discovery. case than would a judge before whom the case was originally filed.
129
To the contrary, there are several reasons.
Legislative History of Section 1407
The Senate's and House of Representative's final reports on § 1407 make clear that remand is to occur when pretrial is completed.
1 30 The most telling indication of congressional intent is the following statement from the reports: "if proposed section 1407 should be enacted and future experience justifies extending it to include consolidation and coordinationfor trial purposes as well, only minor amendments to the present language of the bill will be necessary." It is not by happenstance that § 1407 permits pretrial transfer only; Congress considered allowing consolidation for trial as well, but decided not to permit such transfers and gave explicit reasons for its conclusion. A transferee court's use of § 1404(a) achieves precisely what Congress did not allow-trial in the transferee court. Congressional amendment, notjudicial proclamation, is necessary for consolidated cases properly to be tried in the transferee forum. The legislative history clearly reflects an understanding that § 1407 cannot effect a change in the location of trial. Several letters included in the Senate Report mention the "temporary" nature of a transfer.
13 2 Section 1407 was the brainchild of the Coordinating Committee for the electrical equipment antitrust cases. 133 In its report on then proposed § 1407, the Committee declared: The statute affects only the pre-trial stages in multi-district litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude transfer under other statutes (e.g., Title 28, U.S.C. § § 1404(a) and 1406(a)) prior to or at the conclusion of pre-trial proceedings.
Limited Transfer.
The major innovation proposed is transfer solely for pre-trial purposes. The statute's objectives of eliminating conflict and duplication and of assuring efficient and economical pre-trial proceedings would thus be achieved without losing the benefits of local trials in the appropriate districts. The report depicts how § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) interact with § 1407. The former sections may be used "prior to or at the conclusion of pre-trial proceedings."
136 Before pretrial, cases are in the transferor forum. It would be impossible for a transferee court to handle a § 1404(a) motion; the transferee court would be unknown. Likewise, at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings the transferee court is precluded from making a § 1404(a) ruling. "[A]t or before the conclusion of... pretrial proceedings" actions must be remanded, 8 7 if they were not previously terminated. A case cannot be in the transferee forum after the conclusion of pretrial. This analysis leads to one feasible conclusion: transferor courts are singularly empowered to make § 1404(a) decisions. If not, Congress repeatedly emphasized the "pretrial" nature of § 1407 for no reason and wasted its ink when explicating specific reasons for not permitting complete transfer.
Language of Section 1407
Congress enacted § 1407 in accordance with the understanding of the statute in its development stage. Section 1407 states:
Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which is was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated ....
3 8
This language admits of one interpretation: if a transferred action is not terminated before the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, 1 3 9 it must be remanded. When a transferee judge uses § 1404(a) to retain an action for trial, the case remains in the transferee district despite the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, a plain violation of § 1407's language. Given the plain language of the statute and Congress's express statement that § 1407 would require amendment if transfer for trial were to be permitted, 140 it is somewhat troubling that courts have nevertheless developed the § 1407- § 1404(a) technique to retain cases for trial in the transferee forum. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, New Hampshire on October 25, 196841 is a principal case in the judicial development of the § 1407- § 1404(a) combination. Judge Bownes, sitting in the transferee court, acknowledged the difficulty with the statute's language: I must recognize candidly that there is nothing in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) or 1404(a) which directly allows, or even suggests, that the transferee judge has the power to transfer cases to his district, or any district, for purposes of trial.... The power to transfer 1407 cases pursuant to 1404(a) to a single district for trial has been developed by judicial interpretation to meet the problems imposed upon the federal courts by complex and multidistrict cases. Strangely, Judge Lord's careful analysis required a selective view of § 1407's language and legislative history.
146
The decision was upheld on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
147
There is one sure way to get by a statutory language barricadedo an end run around it. The courts, as well as the Panel, 1 4 ' have done so.
Section 1404(a) is Unnecessary for Pretrial
Section 1407 is undeniably pretrial-oriented. The only powers a transferee court need exercise are those necessary to conduct pretrial proceedings 149 or to dispose of actions in the pretrial
143
The advantages of trial in the transferee court, see supra part III.C, undoubtedly make § 1404(a) tempting to the transferee judge. In Hanover, Judge Bownes had before him 32 cases which arose out of a single airplane crash. See id. at 907. On the issue of liability, each plaintiff would have presented very similar evidence and examined the same witnesses, producing up to 32 repetitious trials (assuming no cases came from the same transferor forum). Section 1404(a) enabledJudge Bownes, who was intimately familiar with the matter, to bring all the cases together for a single liability trial.
It is understandable thatJudge Bownes and other transfereejudges foresaw and were tempted by the economies accompanying a § 1404(a) transfer of cases for all purposes. Nonetheless, acting within its constitutional powers, Congress announced that § 1407 would not affect the location of trial in any case. There are numerous situations in which judges may see economies or efficiencies and desire to implement their ideas but are limited by federal statutes. See e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (holding that pendent party jurisdiction is not permitted by statute). The "dilemma" faced under § 1407 is no different.
144 333 F. Supp.
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
145 Id. at 303. 146 See id. NonethelessJudge Lord's twisted reasoning seemed necessary in light of his conclusion at an earlier stage of the matter that the cases before him were so intertwined and complex that transfer "to a single district for trial purposes was a prerequisite to working out a realistic 'trial plan.'" Id. at 301. Judge Lord was truly between a rock and a hard place. 152 When a § 1404(a) transfer is made with no involvement of § 1407, this statement is true; a § 1404(a) transferee court has unfettered control over the case. 5 -Judge Becker's statement, however, is not attributable to a § 1407 transferee court. An example will show why.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) permits a judge to order joint trial of any actions involving a common question of law or fact pending before the court.
1 54 This power is vested in every district courtjudge. Suppose a party in a pending action consolidated for pretrial purposes under § 1407 brings a Rule 42(a) motion before the transferee judge. Can the transferee judge grant the motion and retain the cases for trial? The holding in Plumbing Fixture would lead one to believe he could. Yet this ability would utterly pervert the congressional design of § 1407 and convert "pretrial" in § 1407 to verbiage. If the transferee judge held this power, then anytime § 1407 was employed the judge could try the combined cases simply by using Rule 42(a). Granting a Rule 42(a) motion in a consolidated § 1407 matter is incompatible with the purpose of § 1407 and must, therefore, be outside the limits of the transferee judge's power, if the limitations in the multidistrict litigation statute are to be taken seriously. Judge Becker's statement in Plumbing Fixture-that a transferee judge's power is "coextensive with that of legal rulings [must] be an adjunct to the discovery process"). Transgrud argues that transferee judges are precluded from using § 1404(a). See id. at 804-09. 150 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. A § 1407 transferee court does not have the power to rule on any and all available pretrial motions. Indeed, certain motions that are "pretrial," in the sense that they are most often decided before the start of trial, are incompatible with § 1407's purposes and its mandate of remand at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings. Such a court is entitled to use § 1404(a) to transfer the case to yet another district if it deems a second transfer appropriate. Moreover, nothing prevents the court from using § 1404(a) to send the case back to the court from which it came.
1 4 See FED. R. CiV. P. 42(a).
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Recognizing that a transferee court's powers are limited, it becomes important to determine what powers may properly be exercised. Given the pretrial orientation of § 1407, this determination must be informed by considering which powers are "necessary" and which are "unnecessary" to conduct pretrial proceedings or terminate the claims. Rule 42(a) neither assists a § 1407 transferee judge in pretrial matters nor terminates litigation. Accordingly, Rule 42(a) cannot be utilized. For the same reasons, a change of venue under § 1404(a) is beyond the scope of a transferee court's power. Ruling on a § 1404(a) motion is not necessary to continue or terminate pretrial proceedings.
The Limitations of Section 1404(a)
In addition to the § 1407 problems, § 1404(a) has its own limitations. The panel has noted: "after an order changing venue the jurisdiction of the transferor court ceases ... thereafter, the transferor court can issue no further orders, and any steps taken by it are of no effect."
156 During pendency of § 1407 proceedings, no court other than the transferee court has jurisdiction over or venue of the transferred case-the transferred case does not exist, except in the transferee forum. It does not make sense for a transferee court to assume jurisdiction over a case for trial by ordering a "change" of venue under § 1404(a); the venue is already the transferee court and none other. The language of § 1404(a) illustrates this point: "a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district. " 157 A transferee court using § 1404(a) is not transferring a case to another district. It is simply proclaiming trial jurisdiction over the case.
Transferee courts improperly use § 1404(a) to acquire, rather than relinquish, jurisdiction. A judge granting a § 1404(a) motion always divests himself of jurisdiction over the transferred case. He cannot use this statute to bring actions into his court. 158 A short illustration may prove beneficial. Case X is filed in the Eastern District of New York. Defendant would like the case tried in the Northern District of Iowa. Where can a § 1404(a) motion be filed? Only in the Eastern District of New York. The Northern District of Iowa has no power to rule on such a motion. If the New sence, these courts have created a new "venue" statute sua sponte. l5 9 Section 1404(a) is merely a convenient decoy.
Transferee courts using § 1404(a) often violate its terms in another manner. When contemplating transfer under § 1407, the Panel must consider if transfers "will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of [the] actions." 160 Section 1404(a), however, can be used only when transfer is "for the convenience of parties and witnesses." 161 The courts sometimes forget which statute they operate under. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 162 the Second Circuit affirmed the transferee court's use of § 1404(a), stating that the transfer would assist in the efficient and just conduct of the actions. 163 This statement typifies a transferee court's reasons for employing § 1404(a); the concern is with judicial economies, not, as § 1404(a) requires, the parties' convenience. Moreover, even a transferee court's idea of "convenience of parties and witnesses" may vary greatly from a transferor court's. The concept of "convenience of parties and witnesses" takes on an entirely different meaning when a § 1404(a) motion, encompassing tens or hundreds of cases, is brought before a § 1407 transferee court. In such a setting, the interests of the individual litigants are subordinated to the collective good. 163 See id. at 125. 164 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 165 See Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 7, at 525 ("The major problem that has arisen when these two proceedings [ § 1407 and § 1404(a)] are combined is that the efficiency standards of section 1407 many times overshadow the important individual concerns that the courts examine under section 1404."); infra text accompanying note 188.
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B. The Questionableness of Trial in the Transferee Court by Consent
Section 1404(a) may prove incapable of consolidating all § 1407-transferred cases for trial. If a particular action could not originally have been brought in the transferee court, the transferee judge cannot obtain jurisdiction over the case through § 1404(a). 67 When judges have been unable to consolidate cases for trial via § 1404(a), parties have sometimes consented to trial in the transferee court. 1 68 The legitimacy of consent, however, is highly suspect in light of § 1407's design and the Supreme Court's ruling in
Hoffman v. Blaski.
9
Section 1407's language provides one reason to doubt that consent to trial in the transferee court is permissible. The statute provides that remand "shall" occur upon completion of pretrial proceedings unless the case has been terminated. 170 The fact that the parties agree to trial in the transferee forum seems irrelevant to the statutory scheme; if the transferee court retains the cases for trial by any means it violates the remand requirement. Congress designed § 1407 so that it would not affect the place of trial in any 16 There is at least one additional argument. The Panel "may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988). If a transferee court orders change of venue, the Panel would be precluded from remanding any of the claims listed above. This would be an absurd result in light of the Panel's congressional grant of power.
167 See id. § 1404(a) (declaring that a transfer can only be made to a district where the action "might have been brought"); see also id. § 1406(a) (providing for transfer of cases where venue is improperly laid to "any district or division in which it could have been brought"). 168 See, e.g., In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 551 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that although a § 1404(a) transfer was precluded because the cases could not have been brought in that district, the parties had waived venue and consented to the resolution of a particular issue in the transferee court). But see In re Tax Refund Litig., 723 F. Supp. 922, 925 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that one of four § 1407-consolidated cases could not be acquired for trial for lack of consent by the parties). 170 See supra text accompanying note 138.
363 U.S. 335 (1960).
case. 171 The statute does affect the place of trial when parties consent-but for § 1407 the consent opportunity would not exist.
The rule announced by the Supreme Court in Hoffman also undermines the argument that consent is a valid basis for retaining an action for trial in the transferee court. In Hoffman, the Court considered whether a district court "is empowered by  § 1404(a) Upon transfer, Blaski immediately requested that the Illinois district judge, Judge Hoffman, remand the case. 178 Judge Hoffman denied the motion, and Blaski petitioned the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Hoffman to reverse his decision. 179 The court of appeals granted the writ, ruling that § 1404(a)'s language-"where it might have been brought"-made clear that a case can only be transferred to a district where the plaintiff had a right to bring it. 180 On further appeal in the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that if he "move [d] 
C. Policy Considerations
Even disregarding the impropriety of using § 1404(a) and/or consent to achieve trial in the transferee court, there are serious shortcomings in such a system. These shortcomings, combined with the observation that some multidistrict litigations are beneficially handled through consolidated trial," 8 6 demonstrate the need to amend § 1407.
The Transfer Decision
Currently, the nation's "specialists" in multidistrict litigation-the Panel judges-have absolutely no voice in the trial decision. This is the predominant and individually sufficient reason to amend § 1407; placing the trial decision solely in the hands of the transferee judge is problematic. Additionally, local discovery may be needed to supplement coordinated pretrial. 192 The Panel is uniquely situated to evaluate the merits of consolidated trial from a neutral viewpoint. While appreciating the savings in judicial resources, the Panel could also champion the interests of individual litigants who would be unduly burdened by a consolidated trial. In addition, the Panel would bring its expertise to bear on this important determination and provide guidance to multidistrict litigants through written opinions.
In one specific type of action-parens patriae claims brought by state attorney generals under the Clayton Act for violations of the Sherman Act-Congress has already permitted consolidation for trial.
193 Importantly, Congress mandated that the Panel, not the transferee court, decide whether joint trial is appropriate. Although this provision did not exist when the § 1407- § 1404(a) combination developed, 194 its implications are profound. First, it shows that Congress knows how to permit trial in the transferee forum-by express language. 195 Second, it shows whom Congress desires to make the trial decision-its expert panel on multidistrict litigation.
Limited Transfers Under Section 1404(a)
Section 1404(a) allows transfer only if the proposed district is one in which the action might originally have been brought. 196 If the transferee forum is one in which some of the cases consolidated for pretrial could not have been brought, 1 9 7 and if parties do not consent to trial, the transferee court simply cannot try the cases.
198
This limitation is particularly troublesome when the transferee court needs to consolidate the cases to create a realistic trial plan. 19 9 Amending § 1407 to authorize consolidated trial in any judicial district would eliminate this dilemma.
In 191 Seesupra note 123 and accompanying text (discussingJudge Lord's conclusion that joint trial was necessary because of the interrelated and complex nature of the matter before him). The Florida forum was "better suited" because that transferee judge could use § 1404(a) to consolidate the cases for trial. 20 5 Amending § 1407 to permit the Panel to transfer for pretrial and trial would alleviate this unfortunate extra inconvenience placed upon some multidistrict litigants.
Adding Flexibility
In addition to dispensing with the limitations in § 1404(a), amending § 1407 to permit the Panel to consolidate would create other advantages.
Section 1407 provides that "the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded." 20 6
When a transferee judge consolidates under § 1404(a) the Panel is denied the opportunity to exercise its statutory power to remand these types of claims. Placing the ability to consolidate for trial in the Panel's hands would permit this "early remand" power to be exercised and this obligation to be taken seriously.
7
The asbestos litigation 2 0 8 points to another tremendous advantage that could be realized by amending § 1407. Judge Weiner has over 26,000 cases before him as the transferee judge. Even if every single litigant could originally have brought suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania so that § 1404(a) could be used to consolidate the cases in Pennsylvania for trial, doing so would prove futile. There are countless different types of claims in this massive litigation; 20 9 it would perhaps take a lifetime for a judge to try the different groups of claims. The Panel, however, could do wonders if it had the ability to transfer the claims for trial. After Judge Weiner gains an understanding of the types of plaintiffs, claims, defenses, defendants, etc., through pretrial proceedings, the Panel could strategically transfer groups of cases by type, geographic location, or both to forums throughout the nation for consolidated trials. The ability to vary the trial forum from the pretrial forum could produce significant efficiencies. Developments during pretrial can affect the appropriateness of a consolidated trial just as they can affect the appropriateness of remand under the current § 1407. Therefore, a Panel decision to transfer a matter for all purposes when the matter is first before the Panel might prove erroneous as pretrial events unfold. 1 2 Like the remand decision, the Panel should not make the consolidation decision without input from the transferee judge.
A system to determine whether to consolidate for trial must be modeled on the current system for determining whether to remand: input from the transferee judge as to the suitability of consolidated trial with final authority vested in the Panel. Under this proposal, the Panel would conduct an initial hearing on pretrial transfer, as presently done, during which it would become familiar with the matter. Based on the type of matter, the Panel could make a 29 See id. at 423 (providing examples of the types of cases: "maritime asbestos actions, railroad worker actions, friction materials actions, tire worker actions, etc."). 210 See supra note 75. 211 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (a) (1988) . 212 Cf. Note, supra note 51, at 1039 (asserting that although the Panel might sometimes have to delay a decision on trial until completion of pretrial, "the Panel will usually be able to make early determinations because there is a large degree of predictability in the issues which are suitable for consolidated trial").
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UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:711 preliminary assessment of the possibility for consolidated trial. Upon transfer for pretrial, one or two Panel judges would act as liaison with the transferee judge and monitor the transferred matter. Under the present statute, monitoring is implicitly required because the Panel is obligated to remand all actions, unless terminated in pretrial, 214 and to remand claims, when necessary, before the rest. 215 The Panel's current policy of deference to the transferee judge and the use of § 1404(a) by the transferee courts severely diminishes the monitoring responsibility.
Under the proposal, the assigned transferee judge or judges would pay close attention to each matter, considering seriously the possibility of remand, early remand of selected claims, and consolidation for trial. In certain types of matters, of course, very little monitoring would be required.
At the conclusion of pretrial, litigants would voice their opinions on consolidated trial, if the transferee judge, the Panel, or a party made such a suggestion. If all parties agree to trial in the transferee forum it would automatically occur, assuming the transferee judge is available. A motion to transfer for trial should only involve the Panel when there is difference of opinion.
216
If one litigant favored complete transfer and others opposed it, or if the transferee judge favored joint trial in contrast to the parties, the Panel would become involved.
When there is difference of opinion on a motion for consolidated trial or when the transferee judge believes remand is appropriate, the judge would apprise the Panel of the situation. Like the current remand policy, the Panel judges would often be 215 One commentator notes:
In air disaster cases, liability has frequently been handled on a consolidated basis while determination of damages has been left to transferor courts and local juries. Similarly, the issue of patent validity has frequently been litigated in a single trial; and although infringement has been decided in the same manner, it is more often appropriate for individual handling. The liability issue in antitrust cases has been found suitable for a consolidated trial, and if class actions are involved, disposition in the transferee court is almost certain. Securities litigation also often involves class actions appropriate for consolidation beyond pretrial.
Id. at 1039-40 (footnotes omitted).
214 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (indicating that"action[s]... shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of ... pretrial").
